Security: RFID應用

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開始認識RFID

Posted in 標籤： RFID應用 | 於下午5:00

以下列影片做為開場，讓大家開始認識RFID～
(0'26") Radio Frequency IDentification
(0'45") 起源於1945軍事雷達用途
(0'50") MIT於1999制訂全球標準
(1'20") 辨識=追蹤?
(1'47") 投入發展RFID的企業
(2'30") RFID的應用
(3'00") RFID改變生活 (3'52") 舉例說明
(4'35") 一旦普及，隱私呢？

下列影片也是介紹RFID的生活應用～

下列影片主要介紹RFID的物流應用：供應鏈(0'55")、賣場結帳(2'00")

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RFID易被盜錄

Posted in 標籤： RFID應用 | 於下午4:00

下列影片介紹RFID信用卡是容易被盜錄的～

下列影片介紹RFID門禁卡是容易被盜錄的～

下列影片介紹Mifare卡也是可以被盜錄的～

http://q.sohu.com/forum/5/topic/1896692
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9069558/How_they_hacked_it_The_MiFare_RFID_crack_explained?pageNumber=1
http://www.tf580.com/soft/Mifare-crack-Hack.pdf

下列影片主要介紹以$250的設備就能原距離盜錄RFID(0'15"至1'30")～
The $250 proof-of-concept device - which researcher Chris Paget built in his spare time - operates out of his vehicle and contains everything needed to sniff and then clone RFID, or radio frequency identification, tags. During a recent 20-minute drive in downtown San Francisco, it successfully copied the RFID tags of two passport cards without the knowledge of their owners. Paget's device consists of a Symbol XR400 RFID reader (now manufactured by Motorola), a Motorola AN400 patch antenna mounted to the side of his Volvo XC90, and a Dell 710m that's connected to the RFID reader by ethernet cable. The laptop runs a Windows application Paget developed that continuously prompts the RFID reader to look for tags and logs the serial number each time one is detected. He bought most of the gear via auctions listed on eBay.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/02/low_cost_rfid_cloner/
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/staff/bios/ajuels/publications/EPC_RFID/Gen2authentication--22Oct08a.pdf

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RFID隱私疑慮

Posted in 標籤： RFID應用 | 於下午3:00

下列影片介紹藏在衣褲鈕釦裡的RFID，真是如此則以後大家的隱私就不保了～

下列影片介紹藏在賣場監視系統加上RFID偵測(0'25")之後，消費者的一切都被監控了～

在電影「關鍵報告」中有一幕(2'05")，是主角一路走著看到周邊播出的都是針對他所做的廣告，這也是RFID引發的隱私問題～

下列影片介紹護照裡的RFID若被恐怖份子偵測到然後引爆炸彈攻擊(2'50")，然後介紹可阻隔RFID訊號的防護套～

下列影片介紹可阻隔RFID訊號的錢包～

下列影片介紹可阻隔RFID訊號的保護套～

下列影片介紹www.spiveytechnologies.com的可防非法存取之RFID產品～
It is a novel application of simple circuitry to prevent access to any information stored on the chip of a contactless RFID device. In its normal or “locked” state, the device’s antenna is detuned; effectively analogous to shorting the antenna. In this condition, it is impossible for a reader to access the chip and prevents the chip from transmitting any information; the card is completely disabled. Being completely disabled also prevents the chip from being detected and the card from being tracked. To use a card that incorporates ‘Dead Bolt’ technology, the user positions it near the desired reader, as they would with any such RFID enabled card, then applies and releases a gentle and intuitive pressure. Using time tested piezo technology, this pressure activates our circuitry which momentarily retunes the antenna, “unlocking” the card. Once the antenna is retuned, the reader can energize the antenna, access the chip and the chip can transmit its stored information. As highlighted, this is a momentary condition. Duration of reader access to the chip can be varied to the requirements of the device provider. For purposes of demonstration the card in our video is set at 200 milliseconds. At the end of the predetermined access period our circuitry automatically detunes the antenna, returning the device to its normal or “locked” condition and again, positively preventing access to the chip.

指定下列論文於課堂上研討～

利用無線射頻識別技術達成電子護照防偽之設計長庚大學／資訊管理學研究所／97／碩士
研究生:蔡威緻
指導教授:陳昱仁
結合RFID(電子通道)與二維條碼技術(光接觸通道)於防追蹤之產品保證書機制
國立東華大學／資訊工程學系／97／碩士
研究生:鄭順友
指導教授:楊慶隆

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RFID防偽與防複製

Posted in 標籤： RFID應用 | 於下午2:00

下列影片介紹HP的墨水匣販賣機，其中有一小段提到驗證正品之動作(1'25")～

下列影片介紹Verayo.com的RFID PUF(Physical Unclonable Functions)技術～
To understand unclonability, it is important to understand how RFIDs can be cloned. The first, and perhaps more difficult, method would be to somehow copy the contents of one RFID chip to another. This can be achieved if an attacker gets access to another same kind of uninitialized RFID chip as the one the attacker is targeting. The second, and easier, method would be to program a ghost RF device to act like a RFID chip. Such devices are available on the internet, an attacker would skim the information exchanged between the real RFID chip and reader and then replay the same information using such devices to attack the system.
PUF technology makes it effectively impossible to clone Verayo RFID chips. Even if an attacker gets hold of an uninitialized Verayo RFID chip, and copies all the contents from one RFID chip to the other, including the PUF parameters stored in the Vera M4H IC, the PUFs in the two chips will show very different characteristics. No two PUF based RFID chips will generate the same response to any given challenge. Hence, in the example above, if the same challenge is given to a fake wrist-watch with a copy of the real Vera X512H RFID IC, or a fake ticket with copy of the real Vera M4H RFID IC, the PUF will not provide the expected response to any given challenges.
PUF based RFIDs address the issue of skimming and replay by ghost RF devices as well. In case of Vera X512H IC, each PUF based RFID can generate virtually unlimited number of challenge response pairs. To address the issue of skimming and replay attack, the system should, ideally, use a new challenge response pair every time. A ghost device that would have skimmed the previous exchange between the chip and the reader would not know the new response and fail. In case of a Vera M4H IC, the reader selects a random challenge each time, hence it is almost impossible for an attacker to give a Vera M4H IC a challenge that will be used by the reader for authentication.

http://www.verayo.com/product/pufrfid.html
http://www.verayo.com/brochure/VeraM4H.pdf

下列影片介紹韓國HoloRFID sleeves，用在酒類瓶口防偽封裝～